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Abstract
In this paper, we establish a dynamic game to allocate CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility)
to the members of a supply chain. We propose a model of a three-tier supply chain in a
decentralized state which includes a supplier, a manufacturer and a retailer. For analyzing
supply chain performance in decentralized state and the relationships between the members
of the supply chain, we use a Stackelberg game and consider in this paper a hierarchical
equilibrium solution for a two-level game. In particular, we formulate a model that crosses
through multi-periods with the help of a dynamic discrete Stackelberg game. We obtain an
equilibrium point at which both the profits of members and the level of CSR taken up by
supply chains is maximized.
Keywords: Dynamic Game; Supply Chain; CSR; Stackelberg Game.
1 Introduction
In recent years, companies and firms have been showing an ongoing interest in favor of CSR. This
is mainly because of increasing consumer awareness of several CSR issues, e.g. the environment,
human rights and safety. In addition, the firms are also forced to accept CSR due to government
policies and regulations. Recently CSR has gained recognition and importance as field of research
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field [8, 15]. However, the research field still lacks a consistent definition of CSR and this has
been the center of discussion since several decades. Dahlsrud [9] presented an overview of different
definitions of CSR and summarized the number of dimensions included in each definition. There
is a positive correlation between CSR and profit [19, 20]. Moreover, CSR is an effective tool for
supply chain management, for coordination, purchasing, manufacturing, distribution, and market-
ing functions [14]. According to previous studies, the long term investment on CSR is beneficial
for a supply chain. Furthermore, a sustainable supply chain requires consideration of the social
aspects of the business [23]. Carter et al. [6] established an effective approach and demonstrated
that environmental purchasing is significantly related to both net income and cost of goods sold.
Carter et al. [7] also pointed towards the importance of CSR in the supply chain, in particular
the role played by the purchasing managers in socially responsible activities and the effect of these
activities on the supply chain. Sethi [21] introduced a taxonomy in which a firm’s social activi-
ties include social obligations as well as more voluntary social responsibility. And, Carroll [4, 5]
developed a framework for CSR that consists of economic, legal, and ethical responsibilities.
The members of a supply chain take their decisions based on maximizing their individual net
benefits. In addition, when they need to accept CSR; this situation leads to an equilibrium status.
Game theory is one of the most effective tools to deal with this kind of management problems.
A growing number of research papers use game theoretical applications in supply chain manage-
ment. Cachon et al. [3] discuss Nash equilibrium in noncooperative cases in a supply chain with
one supplier and multiple retailers. Hennet et al. [13] presented a paper to evaluate the efficiency
of different types of contracts between the industrial partners of a supply chain. They applied
game theory methods for decisional purposes. Tian et al. [24] presented a system dynamics model
based on evolutionary game theory for green supply chain management.
In this paper, we consider a discrete time version of the dynamic differential game. The optimal
control theory is the standard tool for analyzing the differential game theory [16]. There are two
different types of information structures in a differential game, open-loop and feedback information
structures. In an open-loop strategy, the players choose their decisions at time t, with information
of the state at time zero. In contrast, in a feedback information structure, the players use their
knowledge of the current state at time t in order to formulate their decisions at time t [11]. We
formulate a model and study the behavior for decentralized supply chain networks under CSR
conditions with one leader and two followers. The Stackelberg game model is recommended and
applied here to find an equilibrium point at which the profit of the members of the supply chain
is maximized and the level of CSR is adopted in the supply chain. We develop an open-loop
Stackelberg game by selecting the supplier as the leader and both the manufacturer and the retailer
as the followers. Using this approach, the supplier as a leader, can know the optimal reaction of
his followers, and utilizes such processes to maximize his own profit. The manufacturer and the
retailer as followers, try to maximize their profits by considering all the conditions. Our model
has two levels, at the first level the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the follower and
we find the equilibrium point. At the second level, we consider the supplier as the leader and the
manufacturer as the follower. In fact, we substitute the response functions of the follower into the
objective function of the leader and we find the final equilibrium point. We propose a Hamiltonian
matrix to solve the optimal control problem to obtain the equilibrium in this game. The paper is
organized as follows: Section 2 is devoted to the problem description and assumptions. Objective
functions, constraints and solution of the game are illustrated in Section 3. A numerical example
is shown in Section 4 and we close with a conclusion in Section 5.
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2 Problem Description and Assumptions
We consider a three stage Stackelberg differential game which has three players playing the game
over a fixed finite horizon model. This model is a three-tier, decentralized vertical control supply
chain network (Figure 1). All retailers and suppliers at the same level make the same decision.
Therefore, consequently the model has only one supplier, one manufacture and one retailer. The
simplified model is shown in Figure 2.
The dynamic game goes through multi-periods as a repeated game with complete information.
This model has a state variable and control variables like any dynamic game. We define the state
variable as the level of social responsibility taken up by companies, and the control variables are
the capital amounts invested while fulfilling the social responsibility. Specifically, all of the social
responsibilities taken up by the firm j at period t can be expressed as the investment Ijt . We
suppose that xt evolves according to the following rule: xt+1 = f(It, xt).
Figure 1: Three-tier supply chain network
More specifically we have the following assumptions:
The function Bt(xt) = δxt represents social benefit which is proportional to social responsibility
taken up by the supply chain system [1].
The function Tt = τIt
[
1 + θ(It)
]
measures the value of the tax return to the members of the
supply chain [10]. Both τ and θ are tax return policy parameters. Specifically, τ is the rate of
individual post tax return on investment (ROI), and θ is the rate of supply chain’s post tax return
on investment (ROI).
The market inverse demand is PM(qt) = a− bqt [17].
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Figure 2: Simplified model of three-tier supply
chain network
The accumulation of the level of social responsibility taken up by the firms is given by xt+1 =
αxt + β1I
S
t + β2I
M
t + β3I
R
t .
Here, β1 is the rate of converting the supplier’s capital investment in CSR to the amount of CSR
taken up by the supply chain; β2 is the rate of converting the manufacturer’s capital investment
in CSR to the amount of CSR taken up by the supply chain and β3 is the rate of converting the
retailer’s capital investment in CSR to the amount of CSR taken up by the supply chain as well
[22].
2.1 The General Framework
He et al. [12] illustrate an open-loop Stackelberg differential game model over a fixed finite horizon
time as detailed in the following:
The follower’s optimal control problem is:
Maxr(·)
{
JR(X0, r(·);w(·)) =
∫ t
0
e−ρtpiR(X(t), w(t), r(t))dt
}
, (2.1)
subject to the state equation
X˙(t) = F (X(t), w(t), r(t)),
X(0) = X0.
(2.2)
where the function F represents the rate of sales, ρ is the followers’s discount rate, and X0, is the
initial condition. The follower’s Hamiltonian is
HR(X, r, λR, w) = piR(X,w, r) + λRF (X,w, r), (2.3)
where λR is the vector of the shadow prices associated with the state variable X ; and it satisfies
the adjoint equation
λ˙R = ρλR −
∂HR(X, r, λR, w)
∂X
, λR(T ) = 0. (2.4)
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The necessary optimality condition for the follower’s problem satisfies
∂HR
∂r
= 0 =⇒
∂piR(X,w, r)
∂r
+ λR
∂F (X,w, r)
∂r
= 0. (2.5)
We derive the follower’s best response r∗(X,w, λR).
The leader’s problem is
Maxw(·)
{
JM(X0, w(·)) =
∫ t
0
e−µtpiM(x, w, r(x, w, λR))dt
}
,
X˙ = F (X,w, r(x, w, λR)),
X0(0) = X0,
λ˙R = ρλR −
∂HR(x, r(x, w, λR), λR, w)
∂x
, λR(T ) = 0,
(2.6)
where µ is the leader’s discount rate and the above differential equations are obtained by substi-
tuting the follower’s best response r∗(X,w, λR) into the state equation and the adjoint equation
of the follower, respectively. We formulate the leader’s Hamiltonian as follows
HM = piM(x, λR, w, r(X,w, λR), λM , ϕ) + λF (X,w, r(X,w, λR))− µ
∂HR(X, r(X,w, λR), λR, w)
∂X
,
(2.7)
where λM and µ are the shadow associated with X and λR, respectively, and they satisfy the
adjoint equations
λ˙M = µλM −
∂HM (X, λR, w, r(X,w, λR), λM , w)
∂X
= µλM −
∂piM (X,w, r(X,w, λR))
∂X
− λM
∂F (X,w, r(X,w, λR))
∂X
− µ
∂2HR(x, r(X,w, λR), λR, w)
∂X2
,
ϕ˙ = µϕ−
∂HM (X, λR, w, r(X,w, λR), λM , ϕ)
∂λR
= µϕ− λM
∂F (x, w, r(X,w, λR))
∂λR
− µ
∂2HR(X, r(X,w, λR), λR, w)
∂λ∂X
,
(2.8)
where λM(T ) = 0 and ϕ(0) = 0 are the boundary conditions.
We apply the algorithm of the above general model as part of our model.
2.2 Notations and Definitions
To facilitate the model, certain parameters and decision variables are used.
Table 1 shows notations and definitions that we use in our model.
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Variables
t Period t
T Planning horizon
qt Demand quantity at period t
a Market potential
b Price sensitivity
xt State variable, degree of taking SR
HS Hamiltonian function of the supplier
HM Hamiltonian function of the manufacturer
HR Hamiltonian function of the retailer
JSt Objective function of the supplier
JMt Objective function of the manufacturer
JRt Objective function of the retailer
BM(xt) Social benefit of the supplier
BS(xt) Social benefit of the manufacturer
BR(xt) Social benefit of the retailer
T S(xt) Tax return of the supplier
TM(xt) Tax return of the manufacturer
TR(xt) Tax return of the retailer
IMt The amount of investment done by the manufacturer
ISt The amount of investment done by the supplier
IRt The amount of investment done by the retailer
d The percentage of investment of the supplier payoff
d̂ The percentage of investment of the manufacturer payoff
w Price of the supplier’s raw material
z Price of sold product by the retailer
δ Parameter of the supplier’s social benefit
δ̂ Parameter of the manufacturer’s social benefit̂̂
δ Parameter of the retailer’s social benefit
λ Quantity discount parameter of the price of raw material
α Deteriorating rate of the level of current social responsibility
τ The rate of individual post tax return on investment (ROI)
θ The rate of supply chain’s post tax return on investment (ROI)
β1 The rate of converting the supplier’s capital investment in CSR
to the amount of CSR taken up by the supply chain
β2 The rate of converting the manufacturer’s capital investment in CSR
to the amount of CSR taken up by the supply chain
β3 The rate of converting the retailer’s capital investment in CSR
to the amount of CSR taken up by the supply chain
Table 1: Notations and Definitions.
3 Objective Functions and Constraints
The objective functions are made to depend on the control vectors and the static variable. The
members of the supply chain attempt to optimize their net profits, which includes minimizing the
cost of raw materials and investment in social responsibility, and maximizing sale revenues and
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benefits from taking social responsibility as well as tax returns. Thus, the objective function of
the supplier is
JS =
T∑
t=1
P St qt − cqt +B
S
t (xt) + T
S
t (I
S
t , It)− I
S
t + dI
M
t
=
T∑
t=1
wqt − cqt + δx
2
t + τI
S
t [1 + θ(I
S
t + I
M
t + I
R
t )]− I
S
t + dI
M
t ,
where, P St is the price of the supplier’s raw material. P
S
t = w. B
S
t (xt) is the social benefit of the
supplier, δ is the parameter of the supplier’s social benefit and T St (I
S
t , It) is the tax return of the
supplier. Similarly, the objective function of the manufacturer is
JM =
T∑
t=1
PMt (qt)qt − P
S
t qt +B
M(xt) + T
M(IMt , It)− I
M
t + d̂I
R
t
=
T∑
t=1
(a− bqt)qt − wqt + δ̂x
2
t + τI
M
t (1 + θ(I
S
t + I
M
t + I
R
t ))− I
M
t + d̂I
R
t ,
where PMt (qt) is the retail price of the product of the manufacturer. B
M
t (xt) is the social benefit
of the manufacturer, δ̂ is the parameter of the manufacturer’s social benefit and TMt (I
M
t , It) is the
tax return of the manufacturer.
The objective function of the retailer is
JR =
T∑
t=1
PRt qt − P
M
t (qt)qt +B
R(xt) + T
R(IRt , It)− I
R
t
=
T∑
t=1
zqt − (a− bqt)qt +
̂̂
δx2t + τI
R
t (1 + θ(I
S
t + I
M
t + I
R
t ))− I
R
t ,
where PRt is the price at which the retailer sells the product to the consumer. P
R
t = Z. B
R
t (xt) is
the social benefit of the retailer,
̂̂
δ is the parameter of the retailer’s social benefit and TRt (I
R
t , It)
is the tax return of the retailer.
3.1 Mathematical Model: Level One
At this level, we establish a Stackelberg game between the manufacturer as the leader and the
retailer as the follower. To calculate the equilibrium at this level, first we calculate the best
reaction function of the retailer, then we determine the manufacturer’s optimal decisions based on
the retailer’s best reactions.
Since our dynamic differential game is an optimal control problem, we can apply the Hamiltonian
function to find the equilibrium of the game [21].
Suppose the time interval is [1, T ]. For any fixed ISt and I
M
t the retailer solves
argmax
IR
t
T∑
t=1
PRt qt − P
M
t (qt)qt +B
R(xt) + T
R(IRt , It)− I
R
t ,
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subject to xt+1 = αxt + β1I
S
t + β2I
M
t + β3I
R
t .
We define the retailer’s Hamiltonian for fixed ISt and I
M
t as
HRt = J
R
t + P
R
t+1(xt+1).
By using the conditions for a maximization of this Hamiltonian, we compute:
IRt =
1− PRt+1β3 − τθ(I
M
t + I
S
t )− τ
2θτ
. (3.1)
The equation of IRt which depends on I
S
t and I
M
t , says that for any given strategy of I
S
t and I
M
t ,
there is a unique optimal response IRt .
xt+1 =
∂HRt
∂PRt+1
= αxt + β1I
S
t + β2I
M
t + β3I
R
t , (3.2)
and by substituting (3.1) in (3.2), we obtain
xt+1 = (β1 − β3/2)I
S
t + (β2 − β3/2)I
M
t + αxt + β3
1− PRt+1β3 − τ
2τθ
. (3.3)
We also have
PRt =
∂HRt
∂xt
= 2
̂̂
δxt + αP
R
t+1. (3.4)
The above sets of equations define the reaction function of the retailer.
For any fixed ISt the manufacturer solves
argmax
IM
t
T∑
t=1
PMt (qt)qt − P
S
t qt +B
M(xt) + T
M(IMt , It)− I
M
t + d̂I
R
t ,
subject to xt+1 = αxt + β1I
S
t + β2I
M
t + β3I
R
t .
Now, we substitute the value of IRt in (3.1) into J
M
t , and we obtain
JMt = (a− bqt)qt − wqt + δ̂x
2
t +
τθ − d̂
2
ISt I
M
t +
τ − 1− β3P
R
t+1 − d̂
2
IMt −
d̂
2θ
. (3.5)
The Hamiltonian function of the manufacturer for fixed ISt is
HMt = J
M
t + P
M
t+1(xt+1) + ut(P
R
t ), (3.6)
consequently, we can obtain the unique optimal response of the follower from the equations as
follows.
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∂HMt
∂IMt
= τ
(
1 + θ
(
(1− τθ)ISt + I
M
t
))
− 1 +
1− β3P
R
t+1 − τ − τ d̂
2
+ (β2 − β3/2)P
M
t+1,
and we get
IMt =
−τθISt + β3P
R
t+1 + (1 + d̂− τ)
2τθ
−
(β2 − β3/2)P
M
t+1
τθ
. (3.7)
Other constraints are
PMt =
∂HMt
∂xt
= 2δ̂xt + αP
M
t+1 + 2
̂̂
δut, (3.8)
ut+1 =
∂HMt
∂PRt+1
= −β3/2I
M
t −
d̂β3
2τθ
−
PMt+1β
2
3
2τθ
+ αut. (3.9)
The equation of IMt depends on I
S
t , and we obtain the final equilibrium in the next section, at
level two.
3.2 Mathematical Model: Level Two
At the previous level, the manufacturer’s optimal function was calculated by using a reaction
function of the retailer. At this level, the reaction functions of two followers (retailer and manu-
facturer) are inserted into the objective function of the leader (supplier), and we can find the final
equilibrium point.
The problem facing the supplier is simply given by
argmax
IS
t
T∑
t=1
P St qt − cqt +B
S
t (xt) + T
S
t (I
S
t , It)− I
S
t + dI
M
t ,
subject to xt+1 = αxt + β1I
S
t + β2I
M
t + β3I
R
t .
The Hamiltonian function of the supplier is defined by
HSt = J
S
t + P
S
t+1(xt+1) + µt(P
M
t ) + ut(p
R
t ). (3.10)
Substitute (3.1) and (3.7) into (3.10), we get the value of ISt , xt+1 and µt+1
∂HSt
∂ISt
= 0, (3.11)
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therefore
ISt =
(β3/2 + β2 − 2β1)
τθ
P St+1 +
(β2 − β3/2)
τθ
PMt+1 +
β3
2τθ
PRt+1 +
3− 3τ − d̂+ 2d
2τθ
. (3.12)
We have
xt+1 =
∂HSt
∂P St+1
, (3.13)
therefore we obtain
xt+1 = αxt + (β1 − β2/2− β3/4)I
S
t +
(−2β2 + β3)(β2 − β3/2)
2τθ
PMt+1 +
(2β2β3)− (3β
2
3)
4τθ
PRt+1
+
(2β2 − β3)(1− τ + d̂) + 2β3(1− τ)
4τθ
.
(3.14)
We also have
µt+1 =
∂HSt
∂PMt+1
= αµt −
(β2 − β3/2)
2
ISt +
(β2 − β3/2)(β3 − 2β2)
2τθ
P St+1
−
(β2 − β3/2)d
τθ
.
(3.15)
And we obtain
P St =
∂HSt
∂xt
= 2δxt + αP
S
t+1 + 2δ̂ut. (3.16)
Since we use open-loop information, the structure variables depend on the time variable and the
initial state variables. The x1 is given initial parameter, u1 = 0 and µ1 = 0. Furthermore, the
boundary condition are PRt+1= 0, P
M
t+1=0 and P
S
t+1= 0.
3.3 Augmented Discrete Hamiltonian Matrix
In this section for solving the optimal control problem formulated in Section 3.1 and 3.2, we
chose an algorithm given by Medanic and Radojevic which is based on an augmented discrete
Hamiltonian matrix [18]. First, we assume[
x˜t+1
P˜t
]
=
[
A B
C D
] [
x˜t
P˜t+1
]
+
[
D
E
]
=
[
Ax˜t +BP˜t+1 +D
Cx˜t + AP˜t+1 + E
]
,
where x˜t+1 =
 xt+1ut+1
µt+1
 and P˜t+1 =
 pSt+1pMt+1
pRt+1
,
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A,B, and C are 3× 3 matrices, and D and E are 3× 1 matrices, such that
x˜t+1 =
 xt+1µt+1
ut+1
 = [ Ax˜t +BP˜t+1 +D ] =
 a11 a12 a13a21 a22 a23
a31 a32 a33
 xtµt
ut
+
 b11 b12 b13b21 b22 b13
b31 b32 b33
 P St+1PMt+1
PRt+1

+
 d1d2
d3
 =
 a11xt + a12µt + a13ut + b11P St+1 + b12PMt+1 + b13P St+1 + d1a21xt + a22µt + a23ut + b21P St+1 + b22PMt+1 + b23P St+1 + d2
a31xt + a32µt + a33ut + b31P
S
t+1 + b32P
M
t+1 + b33P
S
t+1 + d3
 .
(3.17)
The boundary conditions are x˜1 =
 10
0
 and P˜T+1 =
 00
0
.
A =
 a11 a12 a13a21 a22 a23
a31 a32 a33
 ,
where
a11 = α, a12 = 0, a13 = 0, a21 = 0, a22 = α, a23 = 0, a31 = 0, a32 = 0, a33 = α.
B =
 b11 b12 b13b21 b22 b23
b31 b32 b33
,
where
b11 =
(β1 − β2/2− β3/4)(−2β1 + β2 + β3/2)
τθ
.
b12 =
(β1 − β2/2− β3/4)(β2 − β3/2)
τθ
+
(β2 − β3/2)(−2β2 + β3)
2τθ
.
b13 =
(β1 − β2/2− β3/4)(β3)
2τθ
+
(2β2β3)(−3β
2
3)
4τθ
.
b21 =
(β2 − β3/2)(2β1 − 3β2 + β3/2)
2τθ
.
b22 = −
(β2 − β3/2)
2
2τθ
.
b23 = −
β3(β2 − β3/2)
4τθ
.
b31 = −
β3(−2β1 + β2 + β3/2)
4τθ
.
b32 =
−β23 + 3/2β3(β2 − β3/2)
2τθ
.
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b33 =
−β23
8τθ
.
D =
 d1d2
d3
 , where
d1 =
(β1 − β2/2− β3/4)(3− 3τ − d̂+ 2d)
2τθ
+
(2β2 − β3)(1− τ + d̂) + 2β3(1− τ)
4τθ
.
d2 =
(−β2 − β3/2)(6d− d̂− 3τ + 3)
4τθ
.
d3 =
−β3(−7d̂+ 2d− τ + 1)
8τθ
.
Similarly, we can get the values of the matrices C and E
P˜t =
 P StPMt
PRt
 =
 c11 c12 c13c21 c22 c23
c31 c32 c33
 xtµt
ut
+
 a11 a12 a13a21 a22 a23
a31 a32 a33
 P St+1PMt+1
PRt+1
+
 e1e2
e3

=
 c11xt + c12µt + c13ut + a11P St+1 + a12PMt+1 + a13PRt+1 + e1c21xt + c22µt + c23ut + a21P St+1 + a22PMt+1 + a23PRt+1 + e2
c31xt + c32µt + c33ut + a31P
S
t+1 + a32P
M
t+1 + a33P
R
t+1 + e3
 .
(3.18)
Therefore C =
 2δ 2δ̂ 2
̂̂
δ
2δ̂ 0 2
̂̂
δ
2
̂̂
δ 0 0
 and E =
 00
0
 .
3.4 Resolution
The above problem is solved by the sweep method [2], by assuming a linear relation between p˜t
and x˜t
p˜k = Skx˜k − gk. (3.19)
Thus, we can compute
x˜k+1 = (I2∗2 −BSk+1)
−1(Ax˜t −Bgk+1 +D). (3.20)
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Then by substituting (3.19) and (3.20) into the definition of pk+1 as given by the augmented
Hamiltonian matrix, and equating both sides we finally get the difference equations:
Sk = C + ASk+1(I2∗2 −BSk+1)
−1. (3.21)
gk = ASk+1(I2∗2 − BSk+1)
−1 +Bgk+1 −D + Agk+1 − E. (3.22)
The boundary conditions are x˜1 =
 x10
0
 and P˜T+1 =
 00
0
. And then ST+1 = 03∗3 and
gT+1 = 03∗1.
From the boundary conditions we get ST = C and gT = E. Once we get the different values of Sk
and gk by the backward loop, then the values of x˜t and p˜t are computed by a forward loop. And,
consequently we get the values of xt, I
S
t , I
M
t , I
R
t , p
S
t , p
M
t , p
R
t , for all points in time.
4 Numerical Example
In this section we provide a numerical example. We run the following numerical simulations with
mathematica 8. The results presented here are obtained for the following values of the parameters:
a = 6, w = 3.8, c = 2.4, qt = 100000, d = 0.6, c = 0.00001, d = 0.4, d̂ = 0.4, z = 6, θ = 0.01,
and τ = 0.2. We set β1 = 0.3, β2 = 0.5 and β3 = 0.8; and β1 = 0.3, β2 = 0.5. Bt(xt) = δxt, the
potential benefits firms obtain from taking social responsibility, such as increased demand, better
reputation and so on. We set δ = 0.2, δ̂ = 0.2 and
̂̂
δ = 0.2. We assume that the time horizon is
T=10. The initial level of social responsibility is supposed to be x1=1. We draw the results of the
equilibrium from our model, a three-stage Stackelberg dynamic game.
The figure 3 shows the trend of profits from periods one to ten in a Stackelberg game. JS is the
supplier’s profit, JM is manufacturer’s profit and JR is retailer’s profit. We compare the profits
of the supplier, manufacturer and retailer over a time horizon, first while playing the game and
then, without playing the game. Figure 4 shows the difference in supplier’s profits when playing
the game and without playing. JSO is supplier’s profit without playing the game; JS is supplier’s
profit when playing the game. As in the first graph, the second and third one (figure 5, 6) shows
the difference in manufacturer’s profit and retailer’s profits when playing the game and without
playing. JMO is manufacturer’s profit without playing the game; JM is manufacturer’s profit
when playing the game. JRO is retailer’s profit without playing the game; JR is retailer’s profit
when playing the game. Obviously, all of players gain extra profit from playing the games. Figure
7 compares the cumulated profits of the member’s of supply chain, playing game one and without
playing game.
In sum, the supplier, manufacturer and retailer are motivated to play the game because their
respective benefit increases and the supplier as the leader in the game earns more benefit than the
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followers. Of course, this result is obtained with a very specific dynamic game model. Another
one may give different results.
Figure 3: Profits of supplier, manufacturer and
retailer.
Figure 4: Comparison of the supplier’s profit,
playing game one and without playing any game.
Figure 5: Comparison of the manufacturer’s
profit, playing game one and without playing any
game.
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Figure 6: Comparison of the retailer’s profit,
playing game one and without playing any game.
Figure 7: Comparison of the cumulated profits of
the member’s of supply chain, playing game one
and without playing any game.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we investigated a decentralized three-tire supply chain consisting of supplier, manu-
facturer and retailer with the aim of allocating CSR to members of the supply chain system over
time. We considered two-level Stackelberg game consisting of two followers and one leader. The
members of a supply chain play games with each other to maximize their own profits; thus, the
model used was a long-term co-investment game model. The equilibrium point in a time horizon
was determined at where the profit of supply chain’s members was maximized and CSR was im-
plemented among members of the supply chain. We applied control theory and used an algorithm
(augmented discrete Hamiltonian matrix) to obtain an optimal solution for the dynamic game
model. We presented a numerical example and we found that, the benefits of the player increased
when they played the game.
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